Great audiobook "The Freedom of the Will - Jonathan EDWARDS" online free

As religion is the great business, for which we are created, and on which our happiness depends; and as religion consists in an intercourse between ourselves and our Maker; and so has its foundation in God's nature and ours, and in the relation that God and we stand in to each other; therefore a true knowledge of both must be needful in order to true religion. But the knowledge of ourselves consists chiefly in right apprehensions concerning those two chief faculties of our nature, the Understanding and Will. Both are very important: yet the science of the latter must be confessed to be of greatest moment; inasmuch as all virtue and religion have their seat more immediately in the will, consisting more especially in right acts and habits of this faculty. And the grand question about the Freedom of the Will, is the main point that belongs to the science of the Will. Therefore I say, the importance of this subject greatly demands the attention of Christians, and especially of Divines. - Summary from the preface

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PrefaceI.I - Concerning the nature of the willI.II - Concerning the determination of the WillI.III - Concerning the meaning of the terms Necessity, Impossibility, Inability, etc.; and of ContingenceI.IV - Of the distinction of natural and moral necessity and inabilityI.V - Concerning the notion of liberty, and of moral agencyII.I - Showing the manifest inconsistence of the Arminian notion of liberty of will, consisting in the will's self-determining powerII.II - Several supposed ways of evading the foregoing reasoning consideredII.III - Whether any event whatsoever, and volition in particular, can come to pass without a cause of its existenceII.IV - Whether volition can arise without a cause, through the activity of the nature of the soulII.V - Showing, that if the things asserted in these evasions should be supposed to be true, they are altogether impertinent, and can't help the cause of Arminian liberty; and how (this being the state of the case) Arminian writers are obliged to talk inconsistentlyII.VI - Concerning the will's determining in things which are perfectly indifferent, in the view of the mindII.VII - Concerning the notion of liberty of will consisting in indifferenceII.VIII - Concerning the supposed liberty of the will, as opposite to all necessityII.IX - Of the connection of the acts of the will with the dictates of the understandingII.X - Volition necessarily connected with the influence of motives; with particular observations on the great inconsistence of Mr. Chubb's assertions and reasonings, about the freedom of the willII.XI - The evidence of God's certain foreknowledge of the volitions of moral agentsII.XII - God's certain foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral agents, inconsistent with such a contingence of those volitions, as is without all necessityII.XIII - Whether we suppose the volitions of moral agents to be connected with anything antecedent, or not, yet they must be necessary in such a sense as to overthrow Arminian libertyIII.I - God's moral excellency necessary, yet virtuous and praiseworthyIII.II - The acts of the will of the human soul of Jesus Christ necessarily holy, yet truly virtuous, praiseworthy, rewardable, etc.III.III - The case of such as are given up of god to sin, and of fallen man in general, proves moral necessity and inability to be consistent with blameworthinessIII.IV - Command, and obligation to obedience, consistent with moral inability to obeyIII.V - That sincerity of desires and endeavors, which is supposed to excuse in the nonperformance of things in themselves good, particularly consideredIII.VI - Liberty of indifference, not only not necessary to virtue, but utterly inconsistent with it; and all, either virtuous or vicious habits or inclinations, inconsistent with Arminian notions of liberty and moral agencyIII.VII - Arminian notions of moral agency inconsistent with all influence of motive and inducement, in either virtuous or vicious actionsIV.I - The essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions of the heart, and acts of the will, lies not in their cause, but their natureIV.II - The falseness and inconsistence of that metaphysical notion of action, and agency, which seems to be generally entertained by the defenders of the arminian doctrine concerning liberty, moral agency, etc.The reasons why some think it contrary to common Sense, to suppose those things which are necessary to be worthy of either Praise or Blame.IV.IV - It is agreeable to common sense, and the natural notions of mankind, to suppose moral necessity to be consistent with praise and blame, reward and punishmentIV.V - Concerning those objections, that this scheme of necessity renders all means and endeavors for the avoiding of sin, or the obtaining virtue and holiness, vain, and to no purpose; and that it makes men no more than mere machines in affairs of morality and religionIV.VI - Concerning that objection against the doctrine which has been maintained, that it agrees with the stoical doctrine of fate, and the opinions of Mr. HobbesIV.VII - Concerning the necessity of the divine willIV.VIII - Some further objections against the moral necessity of god's volitions consideredIV.IX - Concerning that objection against the doctrine which has been maintained, that it makes god the author of sinIV.X - Concerning sin's first entrance into the worldIV.XI - Of a supposed inconsistence of these principles, with God's moral characterIV.XII - Of a supposed tendency of these principles to atheism and licentiousnessIV.XIII - Concerning that objection against the reasoning, by which the Calvinistic doctrine is supported, that it is metaphysical and abstruseConclusionAppendix